




Modelling Higher Order Evidence with Second Order Imprecise Probability

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Comparison with other views
Other authors have discussed ways in which second order Imprecise Probability are philosophically significant. Jonas Mork, David Sundgren and Alexander Karlsson have written on the formal methods for measuring uncertainty in first and second order probability distributions. Robert Nau has written on the formal method of first and second order expected utility calculation for differentiating between uncertainty and risk in Ellsberg's experiment. My philosophical project concerns a different epistemic problem: modelling an agent's opinions about the possible rational responses to her first order evidence. The second order Imprecise Probability model I employ is correspondingly different.

Leah Henderson has written on representing higher order evidence with first order Imprecise Probability. It is argued that the degree of precision of Imprecise Probability serves as representation of the degree of conviction of the doxastic attitude. This view is also very different from my project.

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